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PLAYBOOK · June 16, 2026

Landscape Business EBITDA Multiples in 2026: Real Ranges From Peak BV, BizBuySell, and Recent Transactions

Landscape business EBITDA multiples in 2026: avg 3.63x to 3.98x per Peak Business Valuation, commercial maintenance platforms 6.5x to 9x. Sourced ranges by business model.

By HMNDP Editorial Team

Landscape Business EBITDA Multiples in 2026: Real Ranges From Peak BV, BizBuySell, and Recent Transactions

Landscape business EBITDA multiples in 2026 sit in a much tighter band than most operators realize, and the gap between a residential mow-and-blow exit and a commercial maintenance platform exit has never been wider. The Main Street average for landscaping companies clocks in at 3.63x to 3.98x EBITDA, per Peak Business Valuation’s 2026 dataset, but commercial maintenance platforms with $2M+ in EBITDA, route density, and 70%+ recurring revenue routinely clear 6.5x to 9x in PE-backed processes. This piece pulls every verifiable multiple datapoint we could find from Peak, BizBuySell, NALP, and recent named transactions, and shows where each operator actually lands on that ladder.

The short version

  • Peak Business Valuation puts the landscaping EBITDA multiple range at 3.63x to 3.98x on average for Main Street deals.
  • Peak also reports SDE multiples of 2.76x to 3.21x and revenue multiples of 0.67x to 0.89x for landscape companies.
  • The BizBuySell Insight Report records a 7% increase in median sale price for landscaping, lawn care, and yard service businesses from 2021 through 2025.
  • Commercial maintenance platforms above $2M EBITDA can transact at 6.5x to 9x in competitive PE processes; recent named comps include Harvest Partners’ continued ownership of Yellowstone Landscape with Neuberger Berman taking minority stakes (December 2024 announcement, closed first half of 2026).
  • The NALP 2025 Financial Benchmark Report shows the median operator at $5.2M revenue, 355 customers, and $14,682 per customer.
  • The Q1 2026 BizBuySell Insight Report shows median small business sale prices steady at $350,000 across 2,345 closed transactions; landscaping pricing follows the same bifurcation between premium recurring-revenue assets and softer demand for marginal performers.

What the Main Street data actually says

The most cited primary source for small-to-mid landscape valuations is Peak Business Valuation. Their landscaping multiples page (updated for 2026) reports three running figures based on closed transactions in their dataset: a 3.63x to 3.98x EBITDA range, a 2.76x to 3.21x SDE range, and a 0.67x to 0.89x revenue range. These numbers describe the typical Main Street operator: $500K to $3M revenue, 6% to 12% adjusted EBITDA, owner-operator at the wheel, residential-heavy customer mix, modest crew count.

Peak’s example math is instructive. A landscape company with $270,000 in SDE receiving a 2.83x SDE multiple values out at $764,100. That implied value is consistent with what BizBuySell sees on actual closed deals. Per the BizBuySell Landscaping & Yard Service benchmark page, the median sale price of landscaping, lawn care, and yard service businesses moved up 7% from 2021 through 2025, with cash flow multiples staying anchored in the high 2x to low 3x SDE range for transactions under $1M.

Two things compress these multiples for Main Street operators. First, customer concentration: when 30% of revenue sits in one HOA or one commercial property manager, buyers discount that revenue stream. Second, owner dependency: when the seller is the estimator, the foreman, the sales lead, and the bookkeeper, the buyer has to factor in the cost of replacing four jobs after close.

Where the multiple ladder actually breaks

The cleanest way to think about landscape valuations in 2026 is a four-rung ladder, with breakpoints driven by EBITDA size and revenue mix.

Tier EBITDA Multiple range Mix profile Buyer type
Solo/local under $200K 2.0x to 3.0x SDE 80%+ residential, owner-run Individual buyer, SBA-financed
Sub-platform $200K to $1M 3.5x to 4.5x EBITDA 40-60% recurring maintenance Strategic local roll-up, family office
Lower-middle market $1M to $3M 5.0x to 6.5x EBITDA 60-75% commercial recurring Sponsor-backed platform tuck-in
Platform $3M+ 6.5x to 9.0x EBITDA 70%+ commercial recurring, multi-branch Private equity, take-private, strategic acquirer

Source: Peak Business Valuation 2026 multiples, BizBuySell Insight Report Q1 2026 small-business medians, and named PE deal terms from PrivSource and PR Newswire releases referenced below. HMNDP analysis.

The commercial maintenance premium

Commercial maintenance contracts trade at a structural premium for one reason: predictable, year-over-year recurring revenue. A typical commercial mowing and maintenance contract runs 8 to 12 months on a fixed monthly invoice, with renewal rates above 85% at mid-size operators with disciplined account management. That’s what gets the 6.5x to 9x range. Compare that to residential per-cut work, which is inherently transactional and subject to weather, customer churn, and the “I’ll just buy a mower” exit risk.

The named PE-backed names in the landscape space all sit at the top of this ladder. Harvest Partners acquired Yellowstone Landscape from CIVC Partners, and in December 2024 Harvest announced a minority investment from Neuberger Berman Capital Solutions that closed in the first half of 2026, with Harvest retaining majority. Yellowstone has executed seven platform acquisitions including Moore Landscapes, Heads Up Landscaping, and Ecoscape.

BrightView, the only publicly traded commercial landscape pure-play, sold U.S. Lawns to The Riverside Company in March 2024 and continues to file annual 10-K and quarterly 10-Q data with the SEC under CIK 0001734713. Reading BrightView’s filings is the closest a private operator gets to seeing platform-level EBITDA margins in real time. For more detail on the BrightView roll-up history, see our coverage at /brightview-acquisitions-2026/.

What moves a multiple up

The same EBITDA number can transact at 3.5x or 7.5x depending on the qualitative profile underneath. The factors that consistently bump multiples in the landscape space, drawn from named transactions and trade press, are:

  • Recurring revenue share. Buyers pay up for contracted maintenance. Above 60% recurring, multiples step up. Above 75%, you cross into platform territory.
  • Commercial mix. HOA, property management, retail, healthcare, and education contracts carry higher multiples than residential per-cut work. Per Lawn & Landscape, commercial-weighted operators also retain customers longer.
  • Geographic density. Route density drops drive time per stop and improves crew hours-billable. A 50-account portfolio inside a 5-mile radius is worth materially more than 100 accounts spread over 30 miles.
  • Crew leader bench. Companies with 2-3 trained crew leaders who can run jobs without the owner present trade at a premium. Companies that fall apart if the owner goes on vacation trade at a discount.
  • Equipment age and maintenance. Mowers, trucks, and trailers all carry book value, but buyers value the operating economics. A fleet with a 4-year average age and documented maintenance history adds working-capital comfort.
  • Customer concentration. No single customer above 10% of revenue is the institutional buyer’s preferred profile. Single-customer concentration above 25% triggers material discounts.
  • Pricing power. Operators who have raised prices 5%+ annually for three years in a row with sub-3% churn signal recession-resistance.

What moves a multiple down

The opposite list matters just as much. Common discount drivers:

  • Owner-as-key-person. If the seller does the sales, estimating, and customer relationships, the buyer is effectively replacing four jobs at close. Multiple compresses 0.5x to 1.5x.
  • Cash-basis books. Buyers and lenders increasingly want GAAP or modified-cash accruals. Companies on QuickBooks cash with no balance sheet discipline lose negotiating power.
  • Tax-fee labor. 1099-misclassification of crew labor is a federal and state exposure. Buyers either discount for the catch-up risk or require the seller to reclassify pre-close.
  • Pesticide licensing gaps. Most states require a licensed pesticide applicator on staff for any chemical work; if the owner is the only license holder, the buyer needs a plan. See our pesticide licensing primer at /pesticide-applicator-license-category-3a/.
  • H-2A or labor dependency. Operators heavily dependent on H-2A workers face seasonal labor risk premiums; see /h2a-program-landscape-crews/ for the regulatory backdrop.
  • Equipment-heavy with no recurring revenue. Buyers will not pay a premium for trucks and mowers without the customer base to back them.

BizBuySell market signal: stable prices, picky buyers

The Q1 2026 BizBuySell Insight Report describes a small business market that has stabilized after the 2024 to 2025 correction. Median sale price held steady at $350,000 across 2,345 closed transactions, with total enterprise value of $2 billion in the quarter. The report flags a clear bifurcation: high-quality, cash-flowing businesses are commanding premium valuations while flat or declining performers are softening. Landscape is a textbook case of this dynamic. Operators with recurring maintenance revenue and clean books are still getting multiple offers; operators with eroding residential lists and lumpy seasonal cash flow are getting discounted.

BizBuySell’s quarterly data tables (free at the link) break out cash flow multiples, asking-to-sold price ratios, and median days on market by industry. For landscaping specifically, BizBuySell’s category-level valuation benchmark page is the cleanest free comp source operators have.

Industry context: a $176.7B market with structural tailwinds

The valuation tailwind sits on top of a structurally healthy industry. IBISWorld’s 2026 Landscaping Services in the US report puts industry revenue at $176.7 billion with 0.9% growth and forecasts a 2.0% CAGR to $195.0 billion by 2031. IBISWorld counts approximately 726,565 US landscaping businesses, which means the median operator is small and the consolidation runway is long.

The NALP 2025 Financial Benchmark Report (based on 2024 data from 142 organizations representing 344 locations) confirms the median operator profile: $5.2M revenue, 355 customers, $14,682 per customer, with the median customer count up 13% year over year. That growth is happening at the same time that Lawn & Landscape’s State of the Industry Report documents a margin compression from 19% to 17% net profit on average, driven largely by labor cost inflation. For more on the labor picture, see our breakdown of the US lawn care market size and the broader landscaping market.

The PE roll-up landscape

The 2024 to 2026 window has been the most active PE roll-up cycle the landscape industry has ever seen. Beyond Yellowstone Landscape (Harvest Partners + minority Neuberger Berman as of 2026) and BrightView (public since 2018), the named sponsor lineup active in landscape includes Roark Capital (TruGreen majority owner since 2017), The Riverside Company (acquired U.S. Lawns from BrightView March 2024), Sentinel Capital Partners, Wind Point Partners, and Trilantic North America.

What this means for sellers in the $1M to $5M EBITDA window: there is genuine sponsor demand. Per CT Acquisitions’ coverage at /lawn-landscape-private-equity-2026/, multiple sponsors are running active landscape platforms, and the tuck-in math at the platform level supports paying 5x to 7x for the right add-on. For employee-owned models, see Davey Tree and Ruppert Landscape, both of which have used ESOPs as an alternative exit structure.

Three landed transactions and what they imply

Public landed comps for landscape are scarce, but three reference points anchor the multiple discussion:

  • Yellowstone Landscape minority recap (Dec 2024 announce, H1 2026 close). Per PR Newswire and PrivSource. Deal terms not disclosed but Yellowstone is the largest pure-play commercial landscape platform after BrightView and consistently described in trade press as a top-quartile-multiple asset.
  • BrightView divests U.S. Lawns to Riverside (March 2024). Per BrightView’s Form 8-K filed July 2025 and Riverside Company press releases. Confirms strategic interest in the franchise residential model at platform-scale prices.
  • Harvest Partners acquires Yellowstone from CIVC Partners (2022). Per Harvest Partners press release and PrivSource. The CIVC-to-Harvest secondary buyout established the modern Yellowstone platform footprint.

Working capital, capex, and the EBITDA-to-cash-flow gap

The headline EBITDA multiple is the conversation starter. The number that actually changes hands at close depends on three normalizations buyers run almost universally: working capital adjustments, deferred maintenance capex, and owner add-backs. Each can move purchase price by 5% to 15% in either direction, and unprepared sellers consistently lose ground on all three.

Working capital is the most contentious. Landscape buyers typically peg a target working capital level based on the trailing 12-month average net working capital and require the business to deliver that level at close. Operators who run lean on the front end and let receivables stretch in the back end give up real dollars at the working capital peg. Operators who collect aggressively and front-load deposit billing on commercial accounts deliver excess working capital, which becomes cash to the seller at close.

Deferred capex is the second normalization. A fleet of mowers and trucks at 7-year average age signals deferred capex to a buyer; the buyer either subtracts an estimated catch-up capex from EBITDA or discounts the multiple. The same fleet at 3-year average age signals operational discipline. The capex normalization typically runs $50K to $200K for a $1M EBITDA operator, depending on fleet age.

Owner add-backs are the third. The defensible list typically includes: above-market owner W-2, personal vehicle expenses, family member payroll above market rate, owner-paid life insurance, and one-time legal or consulting fees. Buyers tend to push back on: club memberships, personal travel coded as business, home office allocations above documented use, and any add-back that lacks contemporaneous documentation. Operators who book add-back items cleanly during the operating period get more credit at close than operators who try to argue them in during diligence.

How to think about your own multiple

The honest test for any operator: pull your trailing-twelve-month EBITDA, adjust for owner comp and any one-time items, and locate yourself on the four-rung ladder above. Then sanity-check against the Peak ranges: 3.63x to 3.98x EBITDA for Main Street, stepping up to 6.5x+ for $2M+ commercial maintenance platforms.

If your number is below 3.5x in your own back-of-envelope math, the question is what’s pulling it down. Concentration? Owner dependency? Lumpy seasonal mix? Each of those is fixable with 12 to 24 months of focused work, and each fix is worth roughly 0.5x to 1.0x of multiple lift. For sellers planning a 2027 or 2028 exit, that math is more valuable than another year of revenue growth.

Methodology

Multiple ranges in this piece are pulled directly from Peak Business Valuation’s published 2026 landscaping multiples, BizBuySell’s Landscaping & Yard Service Valuation Benchmarks page, and the Q1 2026 BizBuySell Insight Report. Industry-size figures come from IBISWorld’s 2026 Landscaping Services in the US report. Operator financial benchmarks come from the NALP 2025 Financial Benchmark Report and the 2026 State of the Industry coverage in Lawn & Landscape. Named transaction data references Harvest Partners, PrivSource, PR Newswire, and SEC EDGAR filings (BrightView, CIK 0001734713). All data verified June 16, 2026.

Limitations

The 3.63x to 3.98x EBITDA range is a Peak Business Valuation midpoint based on their proprietary dataset; their dataset skews toward sub-$3M EBITDA Main Street transactions and does not capture sponsor-to-sponsor secondary deals in the platform range. Specific PE transaction multiples are almost never disclosed publicly outside SEC filings or proxy materials. Yellowstone Landscape minority recap terms were not disclosed. BrightView’s 10-K filings disclose consolidated EBITDA but not segment-level multiple data. Mid-market deals routinely include earnouts, escrows, and rollover equity that distort headline multiples; we have not attempted to normalize for these terms. State-level variation in licensing, labor, and seasonality also creates significant within-tier dispersion that the ladder above does not capture. We did not include EBITDA multiples for tree care or hardscape-only operators, which trade on different ranges. We did not include synergy-driven multiples paid by strategic acquirers; those tend to run 0.5x to 1.5x above the financial-buyer range.

Future Updates

HMNDP refreshes landscape multiple data quarterly to align with the BizBuySell Insight Report release cycle. Next update: October 2026, reflecting Q3 2026 BizBuySell data and any Q2 2026 Peak Business Valuation revisions. The NALP Financial Benchmark cycle runs annually; the 2026 Financial Benchmark Survey participation window is open and we will fold the 2026 report into the next major refresh.

Sources & References